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The main focus of this paper is on the determinants of migrants’ re-
mittances, based on a study of Pacific Island migrants in Australia. Of
growing concern among policymakers in remittance- and foreign aid–
dependent Pacific Island states is the longer term sustainability of external
resource flows. Two island states for which private remittance flows con-
stitute a major source of income and foreign exchange are Tonga and
Western Sâmoa, the subjects of this study. In both instances migrants’
remittances have been the subject of extensive discussion on sustainable de-
velopment in the Pacific Islands (Ahlburg 1991; Appleyard and Stahl 1995;
Bertram and Watters 1985; Connell and Brown 1995; Hayes 1991).
There is current concern that remittances are declining due to lower
migration rates, recession, and a decrease in migrants’ willingness to
remit (Ahlburg 1991; Connell 1990; Miles and others 1992, 66; Marcus
1993, 29; James 1991; Campbell 1992). The rate of growth of migration
to major destinations—New Zealand, Australia, and the United States—
has declined in recent years due to economic recession and tighter immi-
gration controls in the host countries. Return migration has sometimes
been considerable. There is also the prospect that levels of foreign aid
from major donors in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (oecd) will be severely reduced. Although reliance on remit-
tances is growing, remittance decay is expected (Forsyth 1992; Macpher-
son 1992).
An important issue in this situation is whether per capita remittance
levels will decline as the migrants’ length of absence increases and ties to107
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108 the contemporary pacific • spring 1998their countries of origin weaken. It has been suggested that even with con-
tinued migration the anticipated decline in remittance rates is likely to
occur due to family reunification and greater integration of the migrants
in the host communities. This process, it is believed, reduces migrants’
ability and willingness to remit. Since migration by Pacific Islanders is
generally long term, it would follow that the aggregate level of remit-
tances will also decline over time, unless the rate of new migration is suf-
ficient to offset declining average remittance levels among the stock of
“older” migrants.
An attempt to substantiate the remittance-decay hypothesis empirically
can be found in a study specially commissioned by the Forum Secretariat1
that concluded that projected remittance levels over the next decade
would be inadequate to maintain living standards in a number of Pacific
Island countries, including Tonga and Western Sâmoa (Forsyth 1992).
The study relied on secondary data for recorded balance-of-payments
estimates of remittances and on crude estimates of migrant numbers in
the principal host countries. Over the past decade there have been real
declines in disposable income growth in host countries, particularly New
Zealand. John Foster argued that once such movements have been taken
into account, there is little sign of remittance decay, even at the overall
level (1995; see also Brown and Foster 1995). What appears to be remit-
tance decay could be explained by changes in migrants’ disposable income.
Prior to my Sydney survey with Adrian Walker (Brown and Walker
1995), the remittance-decay hypothesis had not been subjected to rigor-
ous empirical investigation. In this paper I report the main empirical find-
ings from this survey of migrants and their remittances, and identify the
main determinants of remittances and their potential responsiveness to
policy interventions. In the light of the remittance-decay hypothesis, par-
ticular attention is given to the significance of migrants’ length of absence
(see also Brown 1997). Primary data were collected from a large sample
of Tongan and Western Samoan migrants in Sydney at the end of 1994,
from which estimates of remittance levels and their composition were made
(Brown and Walker 1995). In this paper remittance decay is examined em-
pirically at two levels. First, time profiles of average remittance levels and
propensities to remit were constructed from estimates for different cohorts
of migrants, based on the number of years since first migrating. These
descriptive statistics are presented in tabular and graphic form. Second,
using appropriate econometric techniques, for each migrant community a
brown • do migrants’ remittances decline over time? 109remittance function was estimated that attempts to separate the effect of
time from all other influences on remittance behavior.
In the next section I briefly discuss migration and remittances in Tonga
and Western Sâmoa, and expectations from the literature regarding the
determinants of remittance behavior. The sample survey and estimated re-
mittance levels are discussed in the third section, and in the fourth section
I describe the Tobit regression model used to estimate the remittance func-
tions and report the results for the two migrant groups. Conclusions are
offered in the last section.
Migration and Remittances in Tonga and Western Sâmoa
The Economic Significance of Remittances
Throughout the Pacific Islands region limited economic growth of domes-
tic economies has led to a steady and domestically unimpeded emigration.
In Tonga and Western Sâmoa this has led to the size of the domestic
population remaining relatively unchanged for much more than a decade,
despite relatively high rates of natural increase. Closely associated with
the increased emigration has been a growing dependence of those remain-
ing on the return flows of remittances. Recent trends in Tongan and West-
ern Samoan migration and the growing importance of remittances in the
migrant-sending economies have been well documented (Ahlburg 1991;
Bertram 1986; Bertram and Watters 1985; Connell 1983; Campbell
1992). Remittances have raised living standards, contributed to employ-
ment (especially in the service and construction sectors), and eased balance-
of-payments problems.
Paul Shankman observed as early as 1974 that remittances by Western
Samoan migrants represented over 50 percent of the national income
(1976). The situation was broadly similar in Tonga (Connell 1983), al-
though documentation of these early trends was less adequate (see Camp-
bell 1992). Since the early 1970s, remittances have remained at similarly
high levels. Between 1980 and 1985, remittances to Tonga were twice as
high as they had been in the previous five years (Connell 1983, 49–50;
Campbell 1992, 71). In 1984 a national income and expenditure survey
in Tonga revealed that 90 percent of households were remittance recipients
and that remittances constituted an average of 28 percent of household
income (Ahlburg 1991). By the mid-to-late 1980s they represented almost
30 percent of Western Samoan and 40 percent of Tongan gross domestic
110 the contemporary pacific • spring 1998product (gdp). Balance-of-payments data (table 1) show that in both
economies net private transfers, consisting mainly of remittances, are as
important a source of foreign exchange as gross earnings from the export
of goods and services. However, official estimates, based on recorded mi-
grants’ transfers, grossly underestimate the true magnitude of these flows.
It has been estimated that in Tonga and Western Sâmoa, unrecorded mi-
grants’ remittances represent anything from 25 to 60 percent of total re-
mittances (Brown 1995a; Brown and Walker 1995). Migrants’ remittances
are possibly greater than all other sources of foreign exchange combined.
Determinants of Remittances
A belief in remittance decay at the level of the individual migrant is per-
haps to be expected. The longer the migrant is away, social ties and dis-
tant perceptions of needs and wants are likely to decline. Successful
migrants may be followed by others from the same family. Initial savings
targets (where they existed) will have been met, and investment in the
host, rather than the source, country seems more rational as the probabil-
ity of return declines. Although migrants face a life cycle of obligations to
their home areas, these obligations are likely to lose their immediacy, to
compete with new obligations, and to be increasingly ignored. It has also
been argued that temporary migrants are able to remit more, partly be-
cause many of their expenses are met by permanent migrants, and partly
because their temporary visas ensure that their return is imminent. It has
been found that migrants permanently overseas were under less pressure
to remit as their village commitments became less intense and less signifi-
cant (Shankman 1976, 59–60) and they had also acquired financial com-
mitments in their host country. On the other hand, it has been suggested
that the peculiarities of the “complex inter-relationships and social obli-
gation patterns of the islanders” could imply a continuation of remittances
by permanent migrants over the longer term, although at possibly lower
levels (Australia 1989).
However, advocates of the remittance-decay hypothesis in the Pacific
Islands have drawn support for their arguments mainly from studies of
migrants in other countries.2 David Forsyth’s study for the Forum Secre-
tariat postulated a remittance-decay function for the Pacific Islands based
largely on evidence from an oecd study of remittance behavior in Europe
(Forsyth 1992; oecd 1987). The longer the duration of the migrants’ stay
abroad, and the greater the associated decline in the number of depen-
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112 the contemporary pacific • spring 1998dents at “home,” the weaker the migrants’ motivations to remit were
assumed to become. This, it was conjectured, explained the “remittance
decay function.” According to Forsyth, “sustained high rates of remittance
tend to be characteristic of migrants who intend staying in the host [coun-
try] for a relatively brief period and then returning home. . . . But such rates
are unlikely to be sustained if the period of residence is extended [which]
suggests a profile over time . . . with remittances reaching a peak soon after
arrival in the host country then gradually declining” (1992, 39). Alterna-
tively, other studies have found little evidence of remittance decay. Guy
Standing cited three studies of Indian migrants that revealed that the level
of their remittances did not decline with time, but rather plateaued at
some positive, constant level (1984).
Until recently there have been only limited data on which to conduct
further investigation, beyond simple extrapolations based on unreliable,
secondary time series data and other evidence often of a more anecdotal
nature. It is surprising how relatively little is known about the Pacific
Island migrant communities in Australia and elsewhere, including their
demography, education and occupation levels, socioeconomic status, and
information pertaining to their remittance behavior and associated fac-
tors. Because remittances can take many forms, including informal trans-
fers in cash or in kind, and can pass through many different channels and
networks, there are clear obstacles to making definitive assessments of
remittance behavior. This is not to deny the importance of other work
that has been attempted in recent years. Unfortunately, the available data
remain fragmentary and often inadequate for statistical analysis. Most of
the existing studies were undertaken using rather small sample surveys
among pockets of Pacific Island migrants, where the sample size was con-
strained by limited budgets available to the researchers, who were most
often students. As a consequence, previous studies of this sort have failed
to produce data sets sufficiently large for purposes of rigorous statistical
analysis. Mele Vete found that for Tongans in New Zealand there was a
correlation between the number of dependents in Tonga and the amount
of remittances (1995). Broadly the same pattern was found by Taiamoni
Tongamoa among Tongans in Sydney (1987). The level of remittances
increased during the first few years of migration, up to around seven
years, then began to decline, although migrants who had been in Austra-
lia for more than eighteen years still sent remittances (Tongamoa 1987,
101–105). On the other hand, Terry Loomis found little evidence of re-
brown • do migrants’ remittances decline over time? 113mittance decay among Cook Islanders in New Zealand (1990, 67). All of
these studies were based on small samples that cannot be considered sta-
tistically reliable and relied on cross-tabulations that cannot isolate the
effects of other variables from the effect of the migrant’s duration of
absence.3
What other characteristics can be expected to affect a migrant’s remit-
tance behavior? Unfortunately, as Robert Lucas and Oded Stark noted,
“there is surprisingly little statistical evidence on the motives for remit-
ting, and the few studies that have appeared are not couched in terms of
testable hypotheses derived from a theoretical framework” (1985, 902).
It is therefore necessary to rely on the limited amount of empirical and
theoretical work available to identify possible variables for inclusion in a
more formal, multivariate regression model.
Two closely related motivational characteristics that stand out in other
studies of Pacific Island migrants are the strength of the migrant’s ties to
the home versus host community, and the migrant’s intention to return.
Variables related to these characteristics, and found to be significant by
other studies, include whether permanent residence had been gained
(which, it could be argued, influences the probability of return migra-
tion); and whether former dependents had joined the migrants living
overseas (Tongamoa 1987). Walker and I found that the presence of a
surviving parent or spouse in the home country increased the migrant’s
propensity to remit, while the larger the number of dependents of the
migrant living in Australia, the less likely the migrant was to be remitting
(Walker and Brown 1995). Where both determining factors had occurred,
remittances were virtually nonexistent (Vete 1995). Generally, as in the
case of Fijians in Sydney, the volume and regularity of remittances was
found to be a positive function of intent to return (Stanwix and Connell
1995). This has been well documented in the case of Tongans and Cook
Islanders overseas (Loomis 1990).
As family ties have been found to be important determinants of remit-
tances, it is commonly believed that migrants are unlikely to remit for
purposes other than altruistic support of family consumption. However,
some authors have suggested that migrants’ remittances are motivated as
well by other factors that could offset any weakening of the altruistic
motive. Stark (1991a, 1991b) and Lucas and Stark (1985), for instance,
argued that the migration decision is best understood as part of the
family’s risk reduction or “family co-insurance arrangement,” which they
114 the contemporary pacific • spring 1998likened to the portfolio-investment strategy of a firm and in which there is
an intertemporal contractual agreement between the migrant and “home”
(see also Hayes 1991; Hoddinott 1992). Following two earlier studies
(Johnson and Whitelaw 1974; Rempel and Lobdell 1978), Lucas and Stark
argued that remittances are often a repayment of the expenditure by family
in the migrant’s education and are thus directly related to the migrant’s
educational level. The household may even consciously persuade and
sponsor various members to migrate, as an insurance against times of
hardship and in anticipation of eventual repayment. Bernard Poirine has
taken this argument a step further, arguing that remittances often consti-
tute part of an informal loan agreement between the migrant and nonmi-
grant family members through which the investment in the migrant’s
human capital is financed (the loan) and later repaid by the working
migrant (the remittances) (1995). After the loan is repaid the migrant
sometimes becomes a source of loan finance for investment in the educa-
tion of the next generation of nonmigrants, implying no tendency for
remittances to decay.
It has also been found that self-interest can play a part in the migrants’
decision-making framework, either in terms of inheritance-seeking be-
havior or as rational investors. From studies of migrants in Botswana,
India, and the Philippines, Stark found evidence of remittances that were
motivated by “tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest” (1991a,
1991b). He suggested that “considerations such as an aspiration to in-
herit, maintenance of rural investments, and the intention to return mean
that the migrant retains a vested interest in his original home beyond
altruism” (1991b, 40). An inheritance seeker will continue to remit in
order to stay in favor with family. In his study in Kenya, John Hoddinott
found that if the migrant was a son there was a positive relationship
between the parent’s owning land and the amount of remittances sent
(1992). If there was more than one son the effects were more evident.
The migration decision is also sometimes motivated by “target saving,”
implying that such migrants will retain much of their savings with them in
the host country, only remitting their accumulated savings on, or over a
period shortly before, their final return (Piore 1979; Quibria and Thant
1988).4 In such cases one could anticipate a remittance profile that is pos-
itively sloped over the latter part of the migrant’s stay. Rashid Amjad sug-
gested that this factor may explain why, in the case of Pakistan, remit-
tance levels did not decline as the remittance-decay hypothesis would
brown • do migrants’ remittances decline over time? 115suggest (1986). Especially where a migrant is intending to return home to
retire, remittances of accumulated savings would not necessarily take the
form of one lump-sum transfer at the end of the migrant’s period of ab-
sence, but would still be concentrated over a number of years prior to the
migrant’s retirement. Stark (1991a) and Cluny Macpherson (1994, 108–
113) suggested that, in this case, migrants would transfer savings into
long-term assets such as land, housing, or livestock, and possibly other
community or “social” assets with a view to enhancing their personal
prestige or political influence in the home community. Remittance behav-
ior that is motivated by this form of investment may continue indepen-
dently of altruistic support of family consumption.
In other situations, migrants sometimes evolve into small entrepre-
neurs. Studies from the Caribbean countries reported in Sergio Diaz-
Briquets and Sidney Weintraub’s volume found strong links between re-
mittances and small business development in the remittance-receiving
economies, also indicative of at least some investment-motivated behavior
(1991). Reporting on the uses of remittances in a Punjabi village, Arthur
Helweg described an evolution of remittance use beyond altruistic family
support to what he termed the “business investment stage” (1983, 440–
41). For the Pacific Islands, Walker and I found evidence of migrants
motivated to remit for reasons of saving and investment (Brown and
Walker 1995). Remittances in kind and the practice of selling remitted
goods as part of an informal international business operation have been
found to be an important but much-neglected aspect of remittances by
Tongan migrants (Brown and Connell 1993). Such behavior has been
described as a “transnational corporation of kin,” seeking to maximize
extended household incomes across different continents (Marcus 1981;
Bertram 1986).
In another study, Foster, using an econometric analysis of secondary
data on savings and real interest rate differentials, found that Tongan and
Western Samoan migrants’ remittances were responsive to financial
incentives in the remittance-receiving countries (1995). This suggests that
remittances serve as a source of loanable funds and are potentially re-
sponsive to changes in interest-rate differentials.
Irrespective of what motivates remittances, the migrant’s remittance
level and propensity to remit can be expected to be influenced by the
capacity of the migrant to save. This depends largely on the migrant’s
income and net wealth situation, taking into account the number of
116 the contemporary pacific • spring 1998dependents in the migrant household. In the empirical sections that
follow, I attempt to analyze Tongan and Western Samoan migrants’ re-
mittances in terms of a number of characteristics identified here as most
likely to affect their motivation and capacity to remit.
Conceptualizing Remittance Decay
Some analysts have been tempted to draw conclusions about the individ-
ual behavioral or motivational characteristics of migrants from studies
that focus on aggregate remittance levels where these are affected by a
combination of other compositional factors (Swamy 1981; Quibria 1986).5
Inferences from aggregate, secondary data analysis concerning migrants’
motivations for remitting are, at the least, highly dubious. The time pro-
file of aggregate remittances need not bear any relation to the profile of a
typical individual migrant’s remittance function.
To illustrate this, let it be assumed that there are two subgroups in the
migrant community, A and B. Within each group, members share identi-
cal characteristics, with one exception: their length of absence varies. Be-
tween the two groups, characteristics differ in such a way that individuals
from any given cohort in group A remit less than individuals from the
same cohort in group B. In both groups, however, the longer the migrant
has been away, the lower is the level of remittances, other things being
equal. In other words, remittance decay is hypothesized for all individuals
in each group (see appendix A). What determines the aggregate level of
remittances, and how will this change over time?
The average level of remittances for the community (group A plus
group B), at any given point in time, will depend on how the total com-
munity is distributed between the two groups, and the average length of
absence (or age of cohort) for each group. The larger the proportion of
migrants in group B, the higher the average remittance level will be, and
the “older” the average cohort for a group, the lower the group’s average
level of remittances will be. Provided the size and composition of the two
groups do not change, as each year passes the aggregate level of remit-
tances must fall, given the downward slope of each group’s remittance
functions, assuming also that there are no new entrants or departures
from the group. In other words, as each year passes, the average age of
cohort for each group increases and the average level of remittances for
both groups falls. Remittance decay occurs at both the individual and the
aggregate levels.
brown • do migrants’ remittances decline over time? 117What happens when some migrants leave the community (perhaps they
return home or die), other new cohorts join the community, or, the char-
acteristics of some existing cohorts change (perhaps they marry, a parent
dies or is united with them, or their occupational status or income level
changes)? The aggregate level of remittances could move in any direction.
If the total size of the community remains unchanged, but its composition
changes in such a way that there is now a larger proportion of migrants in
group B than before, the decay effect due to the passage of time could be
more than offset by a positive composition effect. The opposite scenario
is also worth considering. If each group’s remittance function were up-
ward sloping, but the composition shifted in favor of those with lower
remittance levels, the aggregate level of remittances could fall over time.
In other words, a negative composition effect could more than offset a
positive time effect, resulting in no decay at the aggregate level despite
remittance decay at the individual level.
Finally, if the rate of net migration is positive, an increase in the total
number of remitting migrants could offset any decline caused by a nega-
tive composition or time effect, and vice versa.6
The aggregate level of remittances, and changes in this level over time,
can therefore be interpreted as the product of these three effects: the time
effect, the composition effect, and the size effect. Nothing can be inferred
about the remittance behavior of the individual migrant from observa-
tions of aggregate remittances over time. Nor can anything be concluded
about movements in aggregate levels of remittances exclusively from
knowledge of individual remittance behavior. To explain and predict
changes in aggregate remittance levels, and to identify policy measures to
influence the level of remittances over time, it is necessary to separate out
the three different effects.
In the Pacific Islands migration literature, concern about remittance
decay appears to stem from beliefs about trends in and interactions be-
tween two of these variables, namely, the size and the time effects. First,
there is valid concern that with a combination of tighter immigration con-
trols in the traditional destination countries and increasing migration
flows from other Asia-Pacific countries, migration and employment op-
portunities for Pacific Islanders are declining. Second, there is a belief, not
substantiated by any empirical evidence, that the longer migrants stay
away from their home countries the weaker their ties and remittance pro-
pensities become, resulting in a negative time effect. If both suppositions
118 the contemporary pacific • spring 1998are correct, there is every likelihood that the aggregate level of remit-
tances will begin to decline, unless other structural changes result in an
offsetting, positive composition effect.
On the other hand, a decline in the rate of new migration would only
result in a negative size effect if migration rates were to fall so low that
the total stock of migrants began to decline. If there is no evidence of a
negative time effect, a negative net migration rate would be required to
bring about a fall in aggregate remittances, unless other composition effects
were also negative.
The purpose of this study is twofold: to identify and quantify the main
compositional variables that influence, positively and negatively, a migrant
community’s remittance levels; and, once the effects of the significant
compositional characteristics have been isolated, to determine how a mi-
grant’s remittance behavior is affected by the passage of time.
Policy Significance
Future trends in remittance levels, as well as their uses, are of great signif-
icance from an economic policy perspective for both the source and the
host countries. There is little doubt that policymakers in the migrant-
sending countries need to ensure the best possible use of both remitted
funds and domestic savings to safeguard the economic sustainability of
Pacific Island populations in the future (see Brown, Foster, and Connell
1995; Brown and Foster 1994, 1995). It has been increasingly apparent in
Pacific Island countries, and in international organizations serving those
countries, that there has been inadequate information on remittances and
their use, and hence on their real and potential contribution to economic
development. If individual remittance rates are found to decay rapidly
over the earlier years of migration, then aggregate remittance levels can
be expected to respond almost immediately to changes in the average
length of absence of the migrant community. Also, if the average length of
absence of the migrant community does affect remittance levels signifi-
cantly, it becomes necessary for the rate of new migration to be main-
tained if a decay in remittance levels is to be prevented. On the other
hand, if migrants continue remitting on a regular basis throughout their
lives, total remittance levels will not decline provided the rate of new
migration is at least sufficient to offset the decrease in the total migrant
numbers arising from death or return migration; that is, provided the
total “stock” of migrants does not decrease.
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tion, as suggested by the remittance-decay hypothesis, it can be expected
that they will lead directly to increased imports of consumption goods
with little impact on the generation of productive investments at home. If,
however, remittances are found to be determined, at least in part, by the
migrants’ choice of saving and investment portfolio, they become poten-
tially responsive to policy intervention by governments eager to attract
higher levels of remittances and to channel them into domestic investment.
The dependence of the Tongan and Western Samoan economies on
migration and remittances is well recognized by their governments, which
have urged governments of host countries to liberalize their immigration
policies to facilitate emigration (Appleyard and Stahl 1995; Australia
1989; Cuthbertson and Cole 1995). Indeed, it has been suggested that in
the context of reduced foreign aid allocations to Pacific Island states,
more liberal immigration policies could be used to support their econo-
mies. Two issues arise here. First, the extent to which remittances are
found to decline with the migrant’s length of absence from home will
determine the extent to which immigration policies in the host countries
would need to be directed toward increasing the intake of new migrants
to compensate for remittance decay and reductions in foreign aid to the
source countries. Second, the extent to which remittances are found to be
potentially responsive to variables other than the needs of the dependents
in the source country will determine the scope that exists for policy inter-
vention by host governments. For instance, they could consider introduc-
ing supply-side policies to encourage higher levels of remittances and the
channeling of these into savings funds or investment projects in the source
countries. The use of selective immigration policy as a complement to
foreign aid is a contentious issue. Sandy Cuthbertson and Rodney Cole
argued that there is little evidence that the safety valve of international
migration enabled sending countries to gain significantly from a reduc-
tion in domestic population or to benefit from the receipt of remittances
to restructure their economies (1995). In the Australian context they
argued against introducing policies to grant Pacific Islanders easier entry
as migrants, on the grounds that this would discourage domestic eco-
nomic development in their home countries. For Cuthbertson and Cole,
migration and remittances have become substitutes for domestic develop-
ment (1995). However, they provide no empirical evidence to support
their assertions.
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The Sample Survey
From late September to early December 1994, a total of 982 households
from the Tongan and Western Samoan communities in Sydney were sur-
veyed. This sample represents about 22 percent of the total Tongan-born
population in Australia and approximately 15 percent of the Western
Samoan–born population as estimated by the 1991 Australian census.7
The precise population size of the Tongan and Western Samoan migrant
community in Sydney is unknown. The 1991 census data were used as a
proxy for the population of the Tongan and Western Samoan migrant
communities in each of the forty-one Statistical Local Authorities (abs
1991).
The targeted migrant communities or populations consist of all house-
holds where at least one member of the household was born in either
Tonga or Western Sâmoa. The “key informant” sampling methodology
was adopted (see Bilsborrow, Oberai, and Standing 1984). Consequently,
the sampled migrant households could not be selected on a purely ran-
dom basis, and neither the probability of the sampling error nor reliable
confidence intervals could be calculated. To ensure that the survey ob-
tained a representative proportion of socioeconomic migrants, the forty-
one Statistical Local Authorities were classified into four socioeconomic
strata. The distribution of migrant households across the authorities was
assumed to reflect the composition of the migrant population in terms of
the relative socioeconomic situation of its members.
Before the interviewing began, church and other community represen-
tatives were approached and the purpose of the exercise explained and
discussed. This ensured the cooperation of the interviewees as well as the
identification, location, and interviewing of the households that make up
the population. It is believed that any biases resulting are largely offset by
the size of the sample, which amounted to approximately one-third of the
total Sydney population of Tongan and Western Samoan migrants.
The survey was conducted by interviewers from the migrant communi-
ties themselves. To minimize sample bias, a number of other procedures
were followed. With the Western Samoan community, a quota system was
used to ensure that the numbers of respondents were apportioned across
the different church congregations in accordance with their estimated rela-
tive sizes, thereby establishing a representative balance among all of the
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community leaders who had access to confidential community lists from
other sources, it was considered unnecessary to follow the same church-
based quota system.
The available budget for the survey limited the target sample to 1,000
households. The target number of households to be surveyed was set at
600 from the Tongan community and 400 from the Western Samoan
community, reflecting the relative size of their populations in the 1991
Australian census. When selecting households for inclusion in the sample,
the interviewers were unable to preselect on the basis of the respondents’
socioeconomic situation. Interviewers were therefore assigned a quota of
households to survey from each of the four strata, on the assumption that
this would ensure a representative cross-section of income levels in the
overall sample. Interviewers were instructed to apportion their samples
across the forty-one Statistical Local Authorities on the basis of the pro-
portions of migrants in each of the strata. As the final sampling was based
largely on migrant households that were associated with the various
ethnic community groups, churches, and other organizations, it is con-
ceivable that households from these higher socioeconomic strata do not
participate as actively in the community organizations. It is therefore pos-
sible that the Western Samoan sample is slightly biased toward house-
holds in the lower socioeconomic groups and with stronger ties to the
Western Samoan ethnic community.
Estimating Remittance Levels
Remittances can take different forms, some of which are not accounted
for in the official balance-of-payments remittance estimates in either the
sending or the receiving country. Remittances are defined here as inclusive
of the following forms of international resource transfer by the migrant
household to households or other parties overseas: money transfers sent
via the formal banking system to households; money transferred infor-
mally in cash (bills) or via an informal agent to households; the value (in
Australia) of all goods sent to households; payments made by the migrant
on behalf of households; donations by the migrant to other institutions or
organizations; and deposits made into bank accounts held by the migrant
overseas.
The official balance-of-payments estimates refer almost exclusively to
the first and last categories (and possibly the fifth), although in Western
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mittances. In Tonga these are treated as revenues from tourism. In either
case they eventually end up in the banking system as current account
receipts, unless they are subsequently used to settle foreign exchange trans-
actions (or simply deposited in offshore bank accounts) through informal
channels.
Migrant transfers in kind, mainly in the form of goods, are sent mostly
to households as “gifts” or “personal effects,” and are often not recorded
as imports and escape any duties. A significant amount of these end up in
informal sector flea markets (Brown and Connell 1993). Most of these
transfers would therefore be unrecorded, either as remittances or as
imports, in the balance-of-payments statistics.
It has also been found that migrants remit to other institutions and
organizations, mainly churches (see Brown 1994, 1995b; Brown and
Walker 1995). Donations are often collected by the churches in the host
countries and held in bank accounts there, to be transferred overseas or
used to settle international payments on behalf of the church in the coun-
try of origin. If these transactions show up at all in the balance-of-pay-
ments records, they do not appear as migrants’ remittances.
Migrants sometimes also make payments on behalf of relatives or
others in their country of origin. These consist of payments for services
such as insurance premiums paid to Australian- or New Zealand–based
companies, schooling and other educational expenses, or, most commonly,
payments for international airfares made directly to the airlines. In most
instances the airfare enables the relative to visit the migrants in their host
countries. This usually also implies that all other travel costs and living
expenses are borne by the migrant. These too should be treated as effec-
tive “remittances” to the country of origin, as they amount to foreign
exchange transfers from the migrants to overseas residents for the pur-
pose of international travel. Such payments would appear neither as cur-
rent account receipts nor as payments for overseas travel.
Finally, it has been found that migrants also transfer money to their
country of origin for the purpose of acquiring assets there on their own
behalf (Brown 1995a; Walker and Brown 1995). These assets could be
financial savings deposits with banks, or other physical assets such as
land, housing, farm equipment and supplies, inventories for small busi-
nesses, and so on. Such transfers can be made directly through the formal
network, but are often undertaken indirectly via a third party or agent on
an informal basis.
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Table 2. Composition of Remittances
Tonga Western Sâmoa
Sample 
average
Remitters’ 
average
Sample 
average
Remitters’ 
average
To Households
Money transferred 1,900 1,003 1,120 1,487
Cash carried 1,100 1,227 1, 115 1, 120
Goods (value) 1,768 1,856 1,685 1,910
Payments on behalf 
of household
1,184 1,205 1,514 1,683
To Others
Donations 1,210 1,234 1, 193 1,124
Savings – – 1, 137 1, 149
total 3,162 3,525 2,464 3,273
Note: All figures in Australian dollars.
Source: Brown and Walker (1995).In this section remittance levels are reported using two different bases,
a “sample average” and a “remitters’ average.” The sample average refers
to the average for the entire sample, including those who did not remit at
all during the previous financial year.8 The “remitters’ average” is based
on the total number of respondents who sent remittances in at least one
of the forms identified earlier. That is, it does not include those who did
not remit in any form. Table 2 shows the two averages for each form of
remittance for both migrant groups.
Two important findings emerge from these data. First, it is evident for
both migrant groups that money transferred to households through the
formal banking system represents only part of total remittances. For the
average Tongan household, a$900 out of a total of a$2,952 was sent to
household members (approximately 30 percent), and for Western Samoans,
a$1,120 out of a total of a$2,334 (50 percent).9 For Western Samoans,
these formal bank (or post office) transfers were the largest single compo-
nent, while, for Tongans, money sent or carried informally was the largest
component (a$1,100). For both groups remittances in kind were substan-
tial, amounting to a$768 per Tongan and a$685 per Western Samoan
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behalf of households in Western Sâmoa were almost as important as
remittances in kind (a$514 per household).
The implication of this finding is that all other estimates of total remit-
tances to Tonga and Western Sâmoa significantly understate the actual
levels, including Forsyth’s (1992) estimates for the Forum Secretariat,
which appear high on a per migrant basis. What do these estimates imply
in terms of total remittance levels? In 1992 total recorded remittances to
Tonga and Western Sâmoa were us$27.2 and us$43.4 million respectively.
In both cases remittances represented almost 90 percent of total exports
of goods and services, or 20 percent of estimated gross domestic product
in the case of Tonga and 30 percent in the case of Western Sâmoa. If the
remittance behavior of all Tongan and Western Samoan migrants is simi-
lar to that of those living in Sydney, and if it is assumed that all remit-
tances sent to other (nonhousehold) recipients pass through the formal
banking system, the 1992 remittance estimates would need to be in-
creased to approximately us$90 million in both cases. Adjusted remit-
tances would then represent approximately two-thirds of gross domestic
product for 1992 in both Tonga and Western Sâmoa, although the esti-
mates of gross domestic product themselves would also need to be revised
upward.
The magnitude of the difference between the sample and remitters’
averages for the two groups is important. From table 3 it is evident that
the average level of remittances per remitting household is very similar for
the two groups.
The average Western Samoan household (and number of potential in-
come earners) is larger than the average Tongan household. However, the
sample average of remittances per household is lower for the Western
Samoans, indicating that a smaller proportion of households remit. This
is verified by the data in table 3, which indicate that 90 percent of Tongan
households and 75 percent of Western Samoan households remitted dur-
ing the previous twelve months. In relation to total household disposable
income, the Tongans remit, on average, a slightly larger proportion of
income despite their higher average per capita income levels, or 9.3 per-
cent in comparison with the Western Samoans’ 8.0 percent. Conceivably,
factors such as the higher incidence of step migration and unemployment
among Western Samoan migrants may account for their lower average
propensity to remit. These and other possible explanatory variables are
tested econometrically in the next section.
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Table 3. Sample Average Remittances and Propensities to Remit
Number of 
households
Remitters’ 
average
Incidence of 
remitters
Sample 
average
Average 
propensity 
to remit
Country of birth a$
Percentage of 
households a$ Percent
Tonga 609 3,525 89.7 3,162 9.3
Western Sâmoa 340 3,273 75.3 2,464 8.0
New Zealand-
born Western 
Samoans
327 1,440 55.6 2,800 2.9
Note: Average propensity to remit = mean remittances/mean income × 100.
Source: Brown and Walker (1995).Table 3 also provides remittance data for the small subsample of second-
generation Western Samoan households. It is remarkable that more than
half of these remitted during the previous year, at an average level of
a$1,440 per remitting household. This indicates that earlier estimates by
Dennis Ahlburg (1991), which suggested that only 30 percent of higher-
order generation Pacific Islanders remit, are perhaps too low. Ahlburg’s
estimate was based on studies by Loomis (1990) and Richard Bedford
(1984), who had used significantly smaller samples.
Time Profile of Remittances
In the absence of reliable time-series data for remittances, the survey esti-
mates of average total remittances per household were calculated for six
cohorts with a view to constructing a remittance function. These data,
summarized in table 4, provide an initial indication of the relationship
between the level of household remittances and the length of time the
migrant has been away. They suggest that for both migrant groups there
is little evidence of remittance decay. The remittance functions, showing
the relationship between average levels of remittances and length of ab-
sence from country of origin, are shown graphically for the two migrant
groups in figure 1.
For both Western Samoan and Tongan migrants, the average level of
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Table 4. Total Remittances by Length of Absence from Country of Origin
Number of 
households
Remitters’ 
average
Incidence of 
remitters
Sample 
average
Average 
propensity 
to remit
Absence in years a$
Percentage of 
households a$ Percent
Tonga
0–5 119 1,995 78.9 1,574 15.4
5–10 169 3,321 91.0 3,022 15.4
10–15 230 3,647 92.6 3,377 19.9
15–20 109 3,502 87.0 3,047 18.2
20–25 159 4,315 81.0 3,495 18.5
25+ 123 3,162 95.7 3,026 17.4
Western Sâmoa
0–5 117 1,875 94.1 1,764 17.2
5–10 162 2,823 77.0 2,174 17.0
10–15 183 2,918 73.5 2,239 16.9
15–20 175 4,280 74.7 3,197 11.1
20–25 166 3,163 63.1 1,996 16.7
25+ 139 3,427 89.7 3,074 18.4
Note: Average propensity to remit = mean remittances/mean income × 100.
Source: Brown and Walker (1995).remittances per household increases after five years of absence (see figure
1). For the Tongan group the average level of remittances rises more
sharply and then levels out, fluctuating within a reasonably narrow band
between a$3,000 and a$3,500 per year. For the Western Samoan group
there is a more gradual but steady increase in the average remittance level
up to the a$3,000 level, which is then followed by a sharp decline to
a$2,000 when the length of absence exceeds twenty years, and a subse-
quent recovery to the a$3,000 level for those who have been away more
than twenty-five years. It also is noticeable that the incidence of remitting
Western Samoan households is highest among the most recently arrived
migrants (94 percent) and decreases quite sharply with the length of their
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twenty to twenty-five years (figure 1b).
By contrast, the incidence of Tongan remitters increases (also to over
90 percent) until the length of absence exceeds fifteen years, and never
falls below 80 percent. The average level of remittances per remitting
household (figure 1c) shows a positive trend for both groups until the
length of absence exceeds twenty years for Western Samoans and twenty-
five years for Tongans. Thus, only when the length of absence and the
incidence of remitters decline together, after twenty years of absence, does
the Western Samoans’ average remittance level show a significant drop.
When both the incidence of remitters and the remittance level per remit-
ting household show an increase when the length of absence extends be-
yond twenty-five years, the remittance function kinks up again.
Another important finding concerns the behavior of those who have
been away for more than twenty-five years. In both instances the incidence
of remitters rises very sharply (figure 1b) reaching 90 and 95 percent for
Western Samoans and Tongans respectively. This finding ought to be in-
vestigated further, as it suggests a significant change in the migrants’ re-
mittance behavior, reversing the negative trend (with both groups) in the
incidence of remitters, and compensating, in the Tongan case, for a de-
cline in the average level of remittances per remitting household. If the
factors explaining such shifts can be identified, some useful policy impli-
cations could emerge.
The propensity to remit was also calculated, where this is defined as
the average level of remittances per sampled household expressed as a
percentage of average household income. Again, these were calculated for
each of the subgroups as reported in table 4 and shown graphically in
figure 2.
The average propensity to remit of the two communities is of a similar
magnitude, moving around the 8 percent level (figure 2a). For the Ton-
gans, it increases sharply after five years of absence (to over 10 percent)
and thereafter shows a steady decline to 7.4 percent. With the Western
Samoan group, however, the average propensity to remit is relatively
stable, at around 7–8 percent, with the exception of the subgroup that has
been away for fifteen to twenty years. For them the average propensity to
remit rises sharply to over 11 percent. The average income level of this
subgroup is very low (figure 2c), suggesting that income level is not a sig-
nificant determinant of remittance level. For the Tongan group on the
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the migrants’ length of absence (figure 2c), the average propensity to
remit declines (figure 2a).
Although these data show little evidence of remittance decay, extreme
caution must be exercised in drawing conclusions from the preceding de-
scriptive analysis. As argued earlier, it is necessary to isolate three differ-
ent effects: the size effect, the composition effect, and the time effect. It is
possible that the remittance levels of the different time cohorts are influ-
enced by compositional effects. In other words, it cannot be assumed that
the compositional structure of each cohort is the same. Differences in aver-
age remittance levels between time cohorts cannot necessarily be attrib-
uted to differences in the average length of absence between the cohorts.
The volatility of the plotted remittance functions in figures 1 and 2 sug-
gests that factors other than length of absence could be important deter-
minants of remittances. To identify the most important compositional
characteristics, and then assess the significance of length of absence while
controlling for all other potential determinants of remittances, a multi-
variate regression analysis was undertaken.
Regression Analysis of Remittance Determinants
The main purpose of the Tobit regression analysis used here is, first, to
identify which of the variables are the most significant determinants of
remittance behavior, where remittance behavior consists of two elements:
whether or not to remit, and, if so, how much to remit; and, second, to
measure the effect on remittance levels, in monetary terms, of changes in
the most significant migrant characteristics. The dependent variable in the
regression model is the value of remittances in Australian dollars in all
forms identified previously over the twelve-month period preceding the
survey.
From the earlier discussion of remittance decay and the literature on
the motivations and determinants of remittances, three broad categories
of factors affecting a migrant’s remittance behavior can be distinguished,
apart from the effect of duration of absence alone.10 First are factors that
influence the strength of the demand-side pressures on a migrant from the
receiving end, in particular, family and community ties. Second are the
supply-side factors that affect the migrant’s capacity to remit, such as in-
come and net wealth. Third are the various behavioral characteristics that
influence the migrant’s motivations to remit, such as self-interest.
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head of household and spouse still have at least one living parent in the
country of origin (parent); whether the head of household is married,
with spouse still in the home country (spouse); whether the household
had received house-guests to stay during the preceding twelve months,
which is an indicator of continued family or community ties (visitor);
and whether the head of household step-migrated to Australia via a third
country (New Zealand), which is a proxy for the migrant’s degree of
remoteness from the original home community (step).
Three supply-side variables are included in the model: household
income level, expressed in Australian dollars, after tax, as declared by the
head of household for the twelve-month period preceding the survey
(income); value of assets held by the household in Australia, less the
value of debts, expressed in Australian dollars (assets); the number of
persons living in the household (housnum).
Eight behavioral or motivational variables are included in the model:
whether the head of household considers that his or her parents are poor,
which would, if significant and positive, indicate that the migrant is moti-
vated by altruism (poor); whether the head of household intended to
return to the country of origin, which, if significant and positive, would
indicate that those planning to return one day remit more than those who
do not (intent); whether the head of household is fifty-five years of age
or more and intends to return home, which, if significant and positive,
would indicate that returning retirees can be expected to remit more than
other returnees (senint); whether the head of household expected to
inherit assets from a parent still living in the country of origin, which
would be significant and positive if the migrant were motivated by inher-
itance-seeking self-interest (inherit); whether the head of household
owned land in the country of origin, which would be significant and pos-
itive if the migrant’s remittances were motivated by continued mainte-
nance of land assets at home (land); whether the head of household
owned assets other than land in the country of origin, which would be
significant and positive if the migrant’s remittances were motivated by
business investment (ownovs); the head of household’s level of education
attained before migrating, at four possible levels: elementary schooling,
secondary schooling, technical training, and university education, which,
if significant and positive, would indicate if Poirine’s (1995) human capital
version of this hypothesis applies (secondary, technical, univ), with the
omitted control category having elementary education only; and whether
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for migration purposes, which ought to be significant and positive if
Stark’s (1991a) informal loan hypothesis holds (helped).
Length of Absence
The model allows the migrant’s length of absence to affect remittance
levels in a number of ways, captured by a set of time-interacted variables:
the number of months since the migrant first emigrated, which if signifi-
cant and negative would indicate underlying remittance decay (time); and
the number of months since the migrant first emigrated squared, which
allows for a possible nonlinear (quadratic) decay function (time2).11
The Results
The means and standard deviations are reported for each of these vari-
ables, for “All Migrants” and “Remitting Migrants” in appendix table A1.
The regression analysis was performed separately for the Tongan and
Western Samoan subsamples. Two sets of results are reported for each
migrant group in appendix table A2, and the main findings are summa-
rized in table 5, showing which variables are significant at least at the 10
percent level.
The Tobit estimates indicate which variables are significant in deter-
mining the desire and ability of migrants to remit. Caution should be
exercised in interpreting the values of the estimates. The marginal effects
indicate the remittance behavior of the overall sample of migrants, both
remitters and nonremitters. In essence, they show how changes in the
characteristics of the average migrant affect the average migrant’s level of
remittances, allowing for the possibility that some migrants in the overall
sample do not remit at all. Take, for instance, the variable parent. It has
a significant effect on the remittance behavior of remitting migrants and
the average migrant in both migrant communities. Table 5 shows that in
the case of Tongan migrants, the existence of a living parent at home
raises a remitting migrant’s annual remittances. Thus, if a remitting mi-
grant’s parents were to die or become united with the migrant household
in the host country, that migrant’s remittances could be expected to fall,
other things being equal. From the marginal effects for the average
migrant (or for one who is drawn randomly from the migrant commu-
nity), the existence or not of a surviving parent affects remittance levels
by a$602 per year, other things being equal. Similarly, as far as income is
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Table 5. Summary Regression Results and Marginal Effects
Tonga Western Sâmoa
Variable Tobit estimates Marginal effects Tobit estimates Marginal effects
parent 2,012.1 ,2602.3 −2,187.5 269.3
spouse 2,402.0 ,2719.0 −1,323.6 163.0
visitor ,2916.0 — −1,457.6 —
step 1,093.6 — — —
income* ,2277.4 ,2223.2 , −2232.9 224.1
assets* — — −22,25.9 220.7
intent — — −3,403.5 419.0
senint 4,459.8 1,335.0 −2,055.5 —
land ,2567.0 — — —
helped — — −, 2821.8 —
Notes: Dependent variable = remittances, a$ per year; — = not statistically sig-
nificant at 10 percent level; * per a$1000.concerned, the Tobit estimates show that for remitting migrants an in-
crease in annual income will result in an increase of annual remittances,
for both Tongans and Western Samoans. The marginal effects indicate
that a a$1,000 increase in annual income can be expected to result in a
a$23 increase in remittances for Tongans, and a a$4 increase for Western
Samoans.
The list of variables included among the statistically significant ones in
table 5 indicates that, for both Tongan and Western Samoan migrants,
remittance behavior is affected by a combination of supply-side, demand-
side, and motivational variables. On the demand side it is evident that
migrant’s remittances are positively related to the existence of a surviv-
ing parent or spouse in the migrant’s home country, and to the variable
visitor, which is a proxy for the strength of ties to the home commu-
nity.12 The results do not support the hypothesis that the strength of ties is
weaker (and hence remittances lower) among migrants who have step-
migrated to Australia from New Zealand. For the Western Samoan com-
munity, a much larger proportion of whom did step-migrate (80 percent)
the variable step is not significant at all, while for the Tongan community
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migrants, indicating that step migrants have a higher propensity to remit
than other remitting migrants.
On the supply side, the migrant’s level of income is significant for both
groups, and the parameter estimates suggest a marginal propensity to remit
of approximately seven percent and three percent for Tongan and Western
Samoan remitters respectively. This result is important for it indicates that
if there is evidence of remittance decay, it could be offset by rising average
income levels over time. Two further observations can be made here. First,
household size and, therefore, the number of dependents is not a signifi-
cant factor in either case. This implies that the number of dependents living
in the migrant households has no effect on the migrants’ remittances to
dependents or others in their country of origin. Second, although house-
hold income earned during the preceding year is significant for both
groups, asset ownership also appears to be an important determinant of
Western Samoan remittance behavior. This could explain why Western
Samoan remittances are possibly less responsive to income changes. In
other words, it is their asset wealth or “permanent income,” rather than
year-to-year fluctuations in household “transitory income” that deter-
mine levels of remittances.13
Evidence exists that motivations other than altruism are important deter-
minants of remittance behavior. First, in both communities there is evi-
dence of self-interest as a significant motivational factor. Migrants who
intend to return home have a significantly higher propensity to remit and
level of remittances than those who do not. This indicates that the pros-
pect of return migration will be associated with a higher-than-otherwise
transfer of remittances, which again is supportive of a self-interest motive.
However, there is one important difference between the Tongan and the
Western Samoan communities. With the Tongan community it is only mi-
grants who are in the fifty-five-years-and-older age group whose remit-
tance behavior is positively related to the intention of returning. A
migrant who is over fifty-five and intends to return home can be expected
to remit more than others. For the Tongan migrant community as a
whole, the marginal effect is a$1,335 per year. In the Western Samoan
community, on the other hand, migrants in that age category remit less
than others who intend to return. A migrant who intends to return can be
expected to remit a$419 per year more than those who do not.
It could be that Tongan migrants prefer to hold their savings in Austra-
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ment. Younger Western Samoans, on the other hand, could prefer to
move their savings into assets in their home country as they earn, but, as
they approach retirement age, may prefer to accumulate more in Austra-
lia. The reasons for these differences are not obvious and require further
investigation. They could reflect differing economic conditions and invest-
ment opportunities in the two migrant-sending countries, which would be
consistent with Foster’s finding that remittances are sensitive to real inter-
est rate differentials between the sending and host countries (1995). This
would also suggest that remittance behavior would be responsive to
changes in economic policy and the personal investment climate in the
migrants’ home country.
Second, there is evidence that financial obligation, or indebtedness, to
the home community is also of importance among Western Samoans. The
significance of the variable helped indicates that having received finan-
cial assistance from relatives at home to migrate positively affects a mi-
grant’s subsequent remittance behavior. Migrants who received assistance
can be expected to remit more than others. However, it is also apparent
that the level of educational attainment before migrating is not associated
with differences in the migrants’ remittance behavior. In other words,
there is no evidence that in situations where parents have invested more in
a migrant’s education that this will induce a higher than otherwise level of
remittances, after taking level of income and other related variables into
account.
Third, asset ownership in the migrants’ home country does not appear
to motivate a higher-than-otherwise level of remittances. However, it is
noteworthy that among Tongan migrants there is some evidence that
remittance levels are positively related to the ownership of land in Tonga,
but this variable is significant only at the 10 percent level.
Finally, the most significant result of the regression analysis is the lack
of any evidence of remittance decay for either migrant community. If
remittance decay were present, the variable time, and those that are inter-
acted with time would need to be statistically significant, either individ-
ually or collectively, allowing also for nonlinear relationships (time2). The
results show that in the case of the Tongan community, while the sign of
time is negative, it is not statistically significant, even at the 10 percent
level. For the Western Samoan community, it is significant at the 10 per-
cent level, but is positive in sign, which indicates that the level of remit-
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changes in all other variables.14 In other words there is no evidence that
the remittance functions of migrants are downward sloping as repre-
sented by the hypothetical remittance functions presented in figure A1,
appendix A.
Conclusions
Migration and migrant earnings are vital not only to the livelihoods of the
migrants and their accompanying dependents, but also to the nonmigrant
relatives and communities remaining in the migrants’ country of origin.
The survey results show that remittances are of far greater significance
than the official balance-of-payments data suggest. The possible decline
in remittances as opportunities for immigration and employment decrease
in the main oecd host countries is of concern to policymakers in the
migrant-sending countries and should be of concern too to policymakers
in the host countries, which are also significant aid donors in the region.
The unrequited private transfers of migrants need to be considered by
host country governments as complementary to official aid flows. The
design of policies to increase remittances either by increasing employment
opportunities for migrants, or by encouraging them to remit more, should
be on policymakers’ agendas in both the migrant-sending and the oecd
host and donor countries.
Whether or not remittances can be expected to decline, and the design
of appropriate government policy to prevent this, depend on a knowledge
of what factors most affect migrants’ remittance behavior and what moti-
vational characteristics policymakers ought to consider in their choice of
policy instruments to stimulate greater remittance flows. Changes in the
aggregate level of remittances were identified as the product of three
effects: the size effect, which is determined by the rate of net migration
and natural attrition in the migrant community; the composition effect,
which is determined by changes in the composition of the community in
terms of those (nontemporal) characteristics that most influence their
remittance behavior; and the time effect, which is the effect that length of
absence alone has on remittance behavior.
The results of this study demonstrate that none of the assumptions
about migrants’ remittance behavior on which the doomsday, remittance-
decay scenario is based, is valid. There is also much less cause for pessi-
brown • do migrants’ remittances decline over time? 137mism concerning the sustainability of remittance levels. The multivariate
regression analysis showed that while demand-side variables affecting the
need for family support are significant, remittances are also driven by sup-
ply-side factors, particularly the migrants’ income level and motivations
to transfer their saving balances and invest in their countries of origin.
Most significantly, it was found that once all other variables are con-
trolled for, the passage of time itself does not have a significant effect on
migrants’ remittance behavior. In other words, if there is no change in the
size or composition of the migrant community, there is no reason to
believe that the aggregate level of remittances will fall. Provided net
migration does not become negative, the size of the migrant community
will not fall.
However, it is conceivable that the composition of the community will
change, which makes it important to identify those compositional charac-
teristics that most affect remittance behavior. Provided the composition
of the migrant community does not move away from those who continue
to maintain strong family and community ties to the home country, and
who retain the belief that they will return home at some future date, there
is no reason to believe that the aggregate remittance function will shift
downward in such a way as to cause an otherwise increasing level of
remittances to decline. As the level of income is highly significant, remit-
tance levels can be expected to respond positively to changes in the eco-
nomic environment affecting employment opportunities and income levels
in the host countries, as well as to policy changes in their home country
that enhance the relative attractiveness of holding financial assets there
rather than in the host countries.
There is therefore more scope for positive policy intervention and coor-
dination on the part of governments in the host and migrant-sending
countries to stimulate the flow of remittances. If remittances were to de-
cline because of a decrease in migrant stocks in oecd economies in the
region, the effects would be severe. From a host-country policy perspec-
tive, these findings reinforce the view that migration and remittances
ought to be considered a major form of economic assistance to Pacific
Island economies, and that immigration and foreign aid policy should not
be considered in isolation from each other. Policy must be addressed
toward harnessing more of migrants’ remittances for development invest-
ment and not toward reducing reliance on remittances by curtailing
migration opportunities.
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Appendix A: Hypothetical Remittance Decay FunctionsConsider a situation as depicted in figure A1, where the two curves A and
B represent the remittance functions of two individuals with respect to
length of absence from home. Curve B is drawn higher than curve A,
which implies that for any given number of years of absence, individual B
will remit more than individual A. For instance, individual B could have a
higher income, or individual A may have no surviving parent still living in
brown • do migrants’ remittances decline over time? 139the home country. The curves are also downward sloping, which assumes
in both instances that the level of remittances decline as the migrant’s
length of absence increases; eg, ra2 < ra1, and rb3 < rb2 < rb1. From this
simple example it can be seen, however, that even though B’s remittance
function lies above A’s, at any given point in time it is possible that indi-
vidual B’s remittances could be lower than individual A’s. For example, if
individual B has been away for three years (at point b3) and A has been
away for only one year (at point a1), A’s remittances (ra1) will be higher
than B’s (rb3). The aggregate level of remittances in this community (of
two migrants) will therefore depend on how long each person has been
away, and, because both remittance functions indicate decay over time,
with the passage of time the aggregate level of remittances must decline,
provided of course that curves A and B don’t shift their position.
Appendix B: Functional Form of the Regression Model
The Tobit model can be specified:
Ri* = β′ Xi + ui    ui ~ N (0, σ2)
where
Ri  = { Ri*, if β′ Xi + ui > 0
Ri  = {0, otherwise
letting R* denote the dependent variable (“remittance behavior”) and R
the recorded value of remittances from the available data. This indicates
that only when R* > 0 will R = R*. When R* ≤0 the observed value of
remittances (R) will be zero. The objective is then to estimate β and σ
using the maximum likelihood method, where Xi is the vector of indepen-
dent variables, and u is a random variable that may be interpreted as the
collection of all the unobservable variables that affect R*.
The remittance function to be estimated can then be specified as:
Ri* = β′ Xi + ε i*
where β′  is a vector of parameter estimates, Xi is a vector of regressors
and ε i* is the error term. For those migrants who remit, R* is the actual
{
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j = 1 k = 1 p = 1 q = 1
3 8 6
 
amount of remittances, while for those who do not, R* is an index of their
willingness to make remittances.
To distinguish the various categories of determinants, it is possible to
specify the estimated remittance function as:
Ri* = η0 + ∑βijDij + ∑γ ikSik + ∑αipMip + ∑δiqTiq + ε i*
where: η0 is a constant
Dij denotes the jth demand-side characteristic of the ith 
individual
Sik denotes the kth supply-side characteristic of the ith 
individual
Mip denotes the pth motivational characteristic of the ith 
individual
Tiq denotes the qth length of absence characteristic of the ith 
individual
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1 This is the permanent secretariat of the South Pacific Forum, an organiza-
tion of the heads of government of the independent and self-governing countries
of the Pacific Islands that began as the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Coop-
eration in 1983, and was renamed the Forum Secretariat in 1988.
2 For a good overview of the literature on migration and remittances in the
third world, see Russell (1986).
3 Tongamoa (1985) surveyed 45 Tongan households in Sydney, while Faiva
(1987) surveyed 150 households. There are no similar studies of Western Samoan
migrants and remittances in Australia. Fuka (1985) surveyed the Tongan com-
munity in Auckland, while Loomis (1990) surveyed just over 200 households in
Auckland in 1981, and 111 in 1985. None of these samples can be considered
sufficiently large for reliable statistical analysis, especially when comparisons are
made between subsamples that in some instances have as few as three observa-
tions (Loomis 1990, 67).
4 However, Rempel and Lobdell (1978), in their econometric analysis of
urban–rural remittances in Kenya, found no significant difference in remittance
levels between those who intended to return and those who did not.
5 Another econometric analysis by Straubhaar (1986) of remittance data from
Turkey over the period 1963–1982 confirmed Swamy’s (1981) earlier findings,
suggesting a hierarchy of determinants in which the economic environment in the
host country was found to be the most influential variable.
6 Strictly speaking the net change in the stock of migrants should also take into
account the decrease in migrants due to natural attrition, that is, death.
7 This calculation is based on the total Tongan- and Western Samoan–born
migrant populations as reported in the 1991 census (see Brown and Walker 1995,
table 1.1: 4; abs 1991). As the survey was undertaken on a per household basis,
it was necessary to multiply the number of households surveyed by the average
number of household members born in Tonga and Western Sâmoa—2.2 and 2.5
respectively. This implies that the survey covered 1,340 Tongan-born migrants, out
of 6,168 in Australia in 1991, and 855 Western Samoan–born migrants, out of
5,742 in Australia in 1991.
8 This excludes those respondents who either did not answer this question at
all or who answered “Don’t know.”
9 The exchange rate was approximately a$1.00 = us$0.72.
10 The functional form of the regression model is discussed in appendix B.
11 In a preliminary run of this model a number of other variables were inter-
acted with time. These included interactions between the number of months since
migration and the existence or not of a surviving parent, which, if significant,
would allow for the possibility of a different rate of decay for migrants who still
146 the contemporary pacific • spring 1998have dependent parents at home; and the number of months since migration and
the intention to return or not, which, if significant, would allow for the possibility
of a different rate of decay for migrants who intend returning. Possible nonlinear
(quadratic) relationships were also included.
12 All three are significant at the 1 percent level in both the Tongan and West-
ern Samoan models.
13 See also Brown and Ahlburg (1997) who show, using the same data set,
that permanent income is a better predictor of changes in remittance levels than
transitory income.
14 The model was also estimated with the variables partim, partim2, intim,
intim2 included to test for a possible remittance decay among migrants with and
without surviving parents at home, and those who intend to return or not. None
of these variables was significant at the 10 percent level, individually or jointly.
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Abstract
There is concern that Pacific Island economies dependent on remittances of
migrants will endure foreign exchange shortages and falling living standards as
remittance levels fall because of lower migration rates and the belief that
migrants’ willingness to remit declines over time. The empirical validity of the
remittance-decay hypothesis has never been tested. From survey data on Tongan
and Western Samoan migrants in Sydney, this paper estimates remittance func-
tions using multivariate regression analysis. It is found that the remittance-decay
hypothesis has no empirical validity, and migrants are motivated by factors other
than altruistic family support, including asset accumulation and investment back
home.
keywords: migration, regression, remittances, sample survey, Tonga, Western
Sâmoa
